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Abstract
Background: Out-of-pocket spending (OOPS) is the major payment strategy for healthcare in Nigeria. Hence, the
paper assessed the determinants socio-economic status (SES) of OOPS and strategies for coping with payments for
healthcare in urban, semi-urban and rural areas of southeast Nigeria. This paper provides information that would
be required to improve financial accessibility and equity in financing within the public health care system.
Methods: The study areas were three rural and three urban areas from Ebonyi and Enugu states in South-east
Nigeria. Cross-sectional survey using interviewer-administered questionnaires to randomly selected householders
was the study tool. A socio-economic status (SES) index that was developed using principal components analysis
was used to examine levels of inequity in OOPS and regression analysis was used to examine the determinants of
use of OOPS.
Results: All the SES groups equally sought healthcare when they needed to. However, the poorest households
were most likely to use low level and informal providers such as traditional healers, whilst the least poor
households were more likely to use the services of higher level and formal providers such as health centres and
hospitals. The better-off SES more than worse-off SES groups used OOPS to pay for healthcare. The use of own
money was the commonest payment-coping mechanism in the three communities. The sales of movable
household assets or land were not commonly used as payment-coping mechanisms. Decreasing SES was
associated with increased sale of household assets to cope with payment for healthcare in one of the
communities. Fee exemptions and subsidies were almost non-existent as coping mechanisms in this study
Conclusions: There is the need to reduce OOPS and channel and improve equity in healthcare financing by
designing and implementing payment strategies that will assure financial risk protection of the poor such
pre-payment mechanisms with government paying for the poor.
Background
Out-of-pocket spending (OOPS) is the major payment
strategy for healthcare in Nigeria. The real challenge of
health care financing in Nigeria as in many countries in
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) lies not primarily in the acute
scarcity of resources, but in the absence of intermedia-
tion and insurance mechanisms to manage risk, and
inefficient resource allocation and purchasing practices
[1]. User fees fall within the broader concept of “cost-
sharing”, a practice whereby beneficiaries contribute
towards the cost of a public service and they are defined
as payment of out-of-pocket charges at the time of use
of services [2].
OOPS for healthcare increased with the introduction
of user fees in the health sector and like most African
countries, Nigeria introduced user fees as a mode of
financing government health services within the frame-
work of the Bamako Initiative revolving drug funds [3].
It is however noted that user fees and revolving drug
funds are interlinked. The introduction of user fees was
arguably in response to the severe problems in financing
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health services in Nigeria, like in most of sub-Saharan
Africa. Government health budgets declined in real
terms in response to macroeconomic problems at the
time while demand for health services increased, partly
because of population growth and successful social
mobilization. Currently, user fees apply to government
owned healthcare services in Nigeria with the major aim
being to generate more funds for the health sector, so
as to improve the quality of services [4]. In the private
sector, patients are also charged fees which they mostly
pay out-of-pocket.
However, public expenditures in Nigeria account for
just 20-30% of total health expenditures (THE), whilst
private expenditures accounts for 70-80% of THE and
the dominant private expenditure is OOPS, which
accounts for more than 90% of private health expendi-
tures [1,5]. The recently introduced national health
insurance scheme (NHIS) is not expected to change the
picture in the near future since it presently covers a
minority comprising only federal government civil ser-
vants. The NHIS plans to initiate community-based
health insurance schemes to cover people employed in
the informal sector in some pilot communities in
Nigeria soon. The prevailing excessive private share of
expenditures in Nigeria is all the more alarming as most
of it takes place via non-pooled OOPS, which has been
noted as the most regressive form of payment [6]. The
composition of THE in Nigeria shows that private
expenditures accounted for 66.5% of THE in 2000 and
74.4% in 2002 [1]. The household OOPS as a proportion
of private health expenditure, has been more than 90%
in all years (Table 1). The Nigerian 2003-2005 National
Health Accounts show that private health expenditure
still constitutes more than 70% of THE [5]. This can
lead to high incidence of catastrophic expenditures [7].
OOPS is about US$ 22.5 per capita, which accounts for
9% of total household expenditures and half of those
who could not access care did not so because of its
costs [8].
In most developing countries, OOPS are regressive
while social assistance and fee exemptions are either
non-existent or where present, are not well targeted at
those most in need [9-11]. The absence of exemption
mechanisms and pre-paid instruments is largely respon-
sible for impoverishing health expenditures [6]. With
70% of the population in Nigeria living below the $1-a-
day [12], the excessive reliance on OOPS curbs health
care consumption, exacerbates the already inequitable
access to quality care, and exposes households to the
financial risk of expensive illness at a time when there
are both affordable and effective health financing instru-
ments to address such problems in low income settings
[6].
Some analysts and donors have argued that introdu-
cing national user fee systems would address inefficien-
cies and inequities in the health system [13-16]. It is
recognized that a user fee policy should include provi-
sions for exemption of the poor. However, implementa-
tion of exemption systems is fraught with problems,
including identifying the eligible poor and administrative
incapacity [17]. Distinguishing the poor from the non-
poor poses practical problems that can render the appli-
cation of waivers and exemption system ineffective.
Hence, a key factor underlying the inequitable impact of
fees was the failure of nearly all governments to design
or implement targeted exemption mechanisms for the
poor [18,19].
There is paucity of information on how OOPS and
other financing mechanisms lead to or have differential
effect on various socio-economic classes in healthcare
seeking, access to care and utilization of services in
Nigeria. The federal government and some state govern-
ments have abolished user fees for the treatment of
some diseases such as malaria for the under-fives and
pregnant women in the public sector. However, user
fees are still in place for the general population and
even for some services for the under fives and pregnant
women. In Uganda, after user fees were abolished in
2001, the observed increase in utilization of health ser-
vices was more among the poor than in other socio-eco-
nomic categories [11]. Some developing countries such
as Viet Nam, Guatemala, India, Mexico, Nepal and
South Africa adopted other pro-poor payment systems
such as waivers and exemptions in response to the
negative impact of user fees [10].
The objective of this study was to assess the incidence
and determinants of OOPS with emphasis on the SES
differences in occurrence and coping mechanisms for
OOPS and other household payment mechanisms.
Thus, this paper provides information that would be
required for improved financial accessibility and equity
in financing within the public health care system, espe-
cially within primary healthcare (PHC) which is the cor-
nerstone of the Nigerian health care system [4].
Generating new knowledge about the determinants and
effects of OOPS in access to and utilization of PHC
Table 1 Private Health Expenditure in Nigeria, 1998-20051, 5
Private Health Expenditures 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Private sector expenditure on health as % of Total Expenditure on health 73.9 70.9 66.5 68.6 74.4 81.3 73.6 74.0
Private households’ OOPs as % of private sector expenditure on health 95.0 94.8 92.7 91.4 90.4 91.0 89.3 90.9
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services, as well as mechanisms to protect the poor from




The study areas were Ebonyi and Enugu states which lie
within the South-east health care zone comprising of 5
states. The study states combined reflect the situation in
Nigeria. In each state, an urban, a semi-urban and a
rural community were selected. Hence, six communities
were purposively selected in the two states (so as to be
representative of different geographic settings). These
were the two state capitals (Enugu and Abakiliki), two
local government area (LGA) headquarters (Udi in
Enugu state and Ezilo in Ebonyi state) and two rural
communities (Eke-na-ene in Enugu state and Nkalagu in
Ebonyi state). Nigeria has an estimated population of
140 million people. Enugu has a population of about
800,000 people, while Abakiliki has about 500,000 resi-
dents. Each LGA headquarters has a minimum popula-
tion of 40,000 people, while each rural community has a
minimum population of 10,000 people. While trading
and civil service work are the major sources of income
in Enugu and Abakiliki, subsistence farming and petty
trading are the major sources of livelihood in the other
four communities.
Each study site has at least one primary health care
centre. In addition, the two state capitals are served by a
teaching hospital while the two Local Government head-
quarters are served by a public general Hospital. There
are also a number of private hospitals/clinics, patent
medicine dealers, and a wide range of private healthcare
providers (including traditional medicine practitioners)
in each study community.
Household survey
The sample size was determined using the formula for
sample size for a definite population, considering 0.25 as
the proportion of the population positive for the health
conditions that will require payments, power of 80%,
confidence interval of 95% and 0.05 as the absolute sam-
pling error that can be tolerated. Hence, 300 households
represented an adequate sample size per study area.
However, in order to take care of refusals, the primary
healthcare (PHC) house numbering system was used as
the sampling frame to select 380 households from each
urban site and 330 from each rural site using simple
random sampling. Using a pre-tested questionnaire (see
additional file 1), data was collected from the primary
woman household care-giver or in her absence, her
spouse. The questionnaires were administered by trained
interviewers who were residents of the various
communities.
The questionnaire was pre-tested amongst 50 resi-
dents of a peri-urban community near Enugu and the
results were used to improve some of the language used
in the questionnaire, some questions, the mode of ques-
tioning and the coding of some responses. We arrived
at the decision to use some specific household assets
and weekly food expenditure to determine socio-eco-
nomic status after discussions with many key informants
from the communities.
The questionnaire explored the demographic and
socio-economic characteristics of respondents and their
households. The questionnaire was also used to examine
the healthcare seeking practices. Healthcare seeking was
measured as number of cases in household in a one
month period that sought healthcare from different pro-
viders. It did not include self-treatment. The expendi-
tures (transportation and actual treatment) to pay for
primary healthcare services for the diseases or health
conditions were determined using the one-month recall
period. Some questions were used to determine the pay-
ment strategies that people used to pay for healthcare
and how they coped with the payments. The payment
mechanisms explored were direct payments with reim-
bursement by employers (reimbursement), out-of-pocket
spending (OOPS), National Health Insurance Scheme
(NHIS), community-based health insurance (CBHI), pri-
vate voluntary health insurance (PVHI) payment in kind
and payment by installment.
The approval for the study was obtained from the
University of Nigeria Research Ethics Committee. Verbal
informed consent was obtained from all the respon-
dents, who were all given the option of not participating
in the study if they so wished
Data analysis
Principal components analysis (PCA) in STATA soft-
ware package [20] was used to create a continuous
socio-economic status (SES) index [21,22] using infor-
mation from the households’ asset holdings together
with the per capita weekly cost of food. The first princi-
pal component of the PCA was used to derive weights
for the SES index [23]. The assets were ownership of
motorcar, motorcycle, radio, refrigerator, television set
and bicycle. In addition the monthly value of food was
also included. The SES index was divided into SES quar-
tiles. Income was not used in defining SES because peo-
ple in Nigeria do not provide reliable information about
their income. Testing of means was used to divide some
key variables into the SES quartiles and Kruskal-Wallis
statistics was used to compute chi-square for trends, in
order to determine whether the means of the quartiles
were statistically significantly different.
The measures of inequity were the ratio of the mean
of the poorest SES group (1st quartile) over that of the
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least poor SES group (4th quartile) (top/bottom quartile
ratio) and concentration index [24-26]. The top/bottom
(Q1/Q4) quartile ratio shows the level of gap that has to
be bridged in order to ensure equity and improve the
condition of the poorest households and a score of 1
signifies perfect equity [22]. The concentration index
varies from -1 and +1 and a negative sign shows that
the variable of interest is higher among the poorest and
if positive, it means that it is more among the richest
(or least poor).
Logistic regression analysis was used to examine the
multivariate relationship of OOPS with key explanatory
variables. The dependent variable was whether or not
someone paid through OOPS. The explanatory variables
were the weight that was used to derive the SES index,
households’ socio-demographic characteristics and costs
of transportation and cost of treatment itself. There
were no prior hypothetical expectations about the rela-
tionship of the dependent and the explanatory variables,
because the analysis was more about hypotheses genera-
tion rather than hypotheses testing.
Results
Characteristics of the respondents and their households
The number of complete questionnaires available for
data analysis were 370, 366, 376, 298, 352 and 300 in
Abakiliki, Ezilo, Nkalagu, Eke-na-ene, Enugu and
Udi respectively (Table 2). The low number of respon-
dents in Eke-na-ene and Nkalagu (rural areas) was due
to the low population there. The reduced number of
questionnaires in the six communities when compared
with the sample selected was because of some few refu-
sals to be interviewed and refusal to answer some of the
questions.
As shown in Table 2, the respondents were mostly
heads of households in the rural areas (with the excep-
tion of Nkalagu), while representatives of households
were the majority of the respondents in the two urban
areas (Abakiliki and Enugu). Also, majority of the
respondents were males in the rural areas (with the
exception of Nkalagu), while the converse was true in
the two urban areas. The respondents from the urban
areas were expectedly more educated than those from
the rural areas. The average years of formal schooling
was 11.5 years in Enugu and 8.6 years in Abakiliki while
it was 4.5 years, 6.0 years, 3.3 years and 6.0 years in Udi,
Eke-na-ene, Ezilo and Nkalagu respectively. Most of the
respondents in the six communities were middle-aged.
The average number of household residents (average
household size) ranged from 4.4 in Enugu to 6.8 in Nka-
lagu. The average weekly household cost of food ranged
from as low as $8.61 in Udi to as high as $26.14 in Nka-
lagu. The average weekly cost of food per household
member was $3.6, $3.0, $4.2, $2.0, 3.5 and $1.2 in Aba-
kiliki, Ezilo, Nkalagu, Eke-na-ene, Enugu and Udi
respectively. The higher amounts in some rural areas
were due to the high costs of home produced and con-
sumed food items there. The households in the urban
areas had better valuable asset holdings than their rural
counterparts and were more likely to own a television
set, refrigerator and motorcar. The observed socio-eco-
nomic and demographic characteristics of the study
sample reasonably reflect that of the of the study
population.
Health Seeking
The study also shows how the respondent sought for
health care (Table 3) in the one-month recall period.
Table 2 Respondents’ and households’ Socio-economic and demographic characteristics
Abakaliki (urban) Ezilo (semi-urban) Nkalagu (rural) Eke-na-ene (rural) Enugu (urban) Udi (semi-urban)
(N = 370) (N = 366) (N = 376) (N = 300) (N = 352) (N = 300)
Household heads: n % 163 43.9 341 93.2 104 27.7 199 66.3 118 33.5 236 78.7
No of household residents:
Mean (SD)
4.8 (2.5) 6.4 (3.4) 6.8 (4.2) 5.9 (2.8) 4.4(2.0) 5.2(2.54)
Age of respondent: Mean (SD) 36.6 (11.2) 42.6 (11.7) 42.1 (13.6) 54.8 (14.1) 40.46(13.34) 54.4(13.5)
Sex (Males) 163 43.9 334 91.3 91 24.2 188 62.7 95 (27.0) 164 (54.7)
Years of education: Mean (SD) 8.6 (4.7) 6.0 (5.1) 3.3 (5.0) 6.0 (4.9) 11.5 (4.7) 4.5(4.4)
Whether married: n % 356 96.0 351 95.9 366 97.3 290 96.7 331 94.0 293 (97.7)
Weekly food cost: Mean (SD) $15.75 ($10.61) $17.21 ($18.0) $26.14 ($28.09) $10.07 ($16.35) $16.98 ($11.15) $8.61 ($9.25)
Radio: n % 347 93.5 323 88.3 346 92.0 276 92.0 346 98.3 239 79.7
Fridge: n % 176 47.4 26 7.1 30 8.0 96 32.0 309 87.8 48 16.0
TV: n % 296 79.8 96 26.2 60 16.0 177 59.0 325 92.3 95 31.7
Bicycle: n % 84 22.6 206 56.3 260 69.1 46 15.3 6 1.7 37 12.3
Motorcycle: n % 169 45.6 58 15.8 47 12.5 20 6.7 41 11.6 17 5.7
Motorcar: n % 50 13.5 5 1.4 23 6.1 60 20.0 106 30.1 14 4.7
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The very poor group (28%) sought health care most
while the poorest group (22%) were least in health seek-
ing in Abakaliki. In Obinagu, the poorest group (30%)
sought for health care most while the remaining percen-
tages were distributed almost equally among the other
SES groups in the community. Health care was sought
most by those in quartile 3 in Ezilo (28%), Nkalagu
(26%), Eke-na-ene (28%) and Enugu (26%). However,
concentration indices showed that the variables of inter-
est were in favour of the worse off in Abakaliki and
Obinagu, and in favour of the better off in the rest of
the study communities. The poorest households were
most likely to use low level and informal providers, such
as traditional healers, whilst the least poor households
were more likely to use the services of high level provi-
ders such as health centres and hospitals.
Expenditures on healthcare seeking
Higher costs of treatment were incurred in the two
urban areas (Abakiliki and Enugu) and the overall mean
monthly cost of treatment per respondent ranged from
440.7 Naira (US$4.01) in Udi to 1477.0 Naira (US
$13.43) in Enugu. Conversely, the average monthly costs
of transportation per respondent were higher in the
rural areas and the people paid an average of 35.3 Naira
(US$0.32) in Eke-na-ene to 162.3 Naira (US$1.48) in
Ezilo. The total treatment costs for other household
members mirrored that of the respondents, although the
highest costs were incurred in Ezilo and Nkalagu.
Payment strategies
OOPS was by far the commonest type of payment
mechanism that was used by respondents to pay for
their healthcare in the six communities (Table 4). This
was followed distantly by installment payment, with the
exception of Abakiliki where reimbursement was the
second most common payment mechanism. The other
payment mechanisms were rarely used, though it was
interesting to find that a few people claimed to have
utilized health insurance, which is still new in Nigeria.
The urbanites significantly used more of OOP payment
strategy, while the rural dwellers significantly used more
of reimbursement, installment payment and in-kind pay-
ment mechanisms. As was the case for respondents’
payment mechanism for healthcare, OOPS was used for
the payment of healthcare for other household members
(Table 4). It was again followed in frequency of use by
payment by installment.
Table 5 shows the different payment-coping mechan-
isms that the respondents used to pay for health care.
The use of own money was the commonest payment-
coping mechanism in the three communities. However,
a sizeable proportion of the respondents in three com-
munities (Ezilo, Nkalagu and Udi) borrowed money in
order to pay for care. The sale of movable household
assets or land was not commonly employed while fee
exemptions and subsidies were almost non-existent as
coping mechanisms. In case of other household mem-
bers, households mostly used their own money to pay
for the healthcare services, although there was some
appreciable use of borrowed money to pay for health-
care in some rural areas (Table 5).
Socio-economic status differentials in use of OOPS and in
coping strategies
In most cases, respondents belonging to different SES
groups used OOPS equally to pay for healthcare with
the exception of Abakiliki where the most poor had the
lowest proportion of people that used the mechanism
(Table 6). However, for other household members there
was a uniform statistically significant SES difference in
the use of OOPS to pay for healthcare in the six study
areas. The most-poor group was less likely to use OOPS
as a payment mechanism compared to better-off SES
groups. Based on the pooled data from the six sites,
although OOPS was the most highly used payment
mechanism by all SES groups, the most poor used reim-
bursement (p = 0.001), in-kind (p = 0.035) and














Q1 (most poor) 49 (22) 57 (24) 76 (23) 49 (24) 78 (24) 48 (30)
Q2 (very poor) 61 (28) 52 (22) 83 (25) 48 (24) 82 (25) 38 (24)
Q3 (poor) 49 (23) 67 (28) 84 (26) 57 (28) 85 (26) 37 (23)
Q4 (least poor) 59 (27) 63 (26) 85 (26) 48 (24) 80 (25) 36 (23)
Chi-square 5.12 6.05 4.78 3.90 4.77 3.03
p-value 0.16 0.11 0.19 0.27 0.19 0.39
Q1/Q4 0.83 0.90 0.89 1.02 0.98 1.33
Concentration
index
-0.24 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.04
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Table 4 Payment mechanisms that were used to pay for healthcare for people that consumed healthcare services
Payment mechanism for the respondents
Abakaliki (urban) Ezilo (semi-urban) Nkalagu (rural) Eke-na-ene (rural) Enugu (urban) Udi (semi-urban)
N = 229 N = 244 N = 333 N = 209 N = 321 N = 174
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%)
OOPs 210 91.7 205 56.0 273 2.0 184 88.0 311 96.9 119 68.4
Reimbursement 6 2.6 7 4.6 19 5.7 6 2.9 2 0.6 15 8.6
Health insurance 0 0 3 0.8 1 0.3 1 0.5 3 0.9 7 4.0
Installment payment 0 0 15 4.1 17 5.1 18 8.6 24 7.5 30 17.2
In-kind 0 0 2 0.5 4 1.2 2 1.0 2 0.6 1 0.6
Others 13 5.7 9 2.4 19 5.7 9 4.4 9 2.7 2 1.2
Payment mechanism for other household members
N = 268 N = 253 N = 349 N = 192 N = 326 N = 148
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%)
OOPS 265 98.9 204 80.6 308 88.3 157 81.8 298 91.4 118 79.7
Reimbursement 2 0.7 17 6.7 7 2.0 6 3.1 6 1.8 13 8.8
Health insurance 0 0 6 2.4 1 0.3 3 1.6 5 1.5 10 6.8
Installment 1 0.4 19 7.5 23 6.6 17 8.9 14 4.3 1 0.7
In-kind 0 0 1 0.4 3 0.9 0 0 0 0 1 0.7
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 5 Payment coping mechanisms
Payment coping mechanisms for respondents
Abakaliki (urban) Ezilo(semi-urban) Nkalagu (rural) Eke-na-ene (rural) Enugu (urban) Udi (semi-urban)
N = 229 N = 244 N = 333 N = 209 N = 321 N = 174
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%)
Own money 210 91.7 181 74.1 283 85.0 190 90.9 311 96.9 144 82.8
Borrowed money 3 1.3 34 13.9 38 11.4 4 1.9 2 0.6 44 25.3
Sold households’ assets 1 0.4 20 8.2 1 0.3 1 0.5 0 0 4 2.3
Sold land 0 0 0 0 1 0.3 0 0 0 0 1 0.6
Someone else paid 11 4.8 4 1.6 7 2.1 7 3.3 8 2.5 8 4.7
Was exempted from payment 3 1.3 1 0.4 1 0.3 0 0 2 0.6 2 1.2
Payment was subsidised 1 0.4 2 0.8 2 0.6 0 0 1 0.3 0 0
Others 0 0 2 0.8 9 2.4 7 3.3 3 0.9 1 0.6
Payment coping for other household members
N = 277 N = 273 N = 348 N = 160 N = 312 N = 179
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%)
Own money 268 96.8 192 70.3 300 86.2 150 93.8 302 96.8 125 69.8
Borrowed money 8 2.8 27 9.9 36 10.3 6 3.8 2 0.6 42 23.5
Sold households’ assets 1 0.4 41 15.0 2 0.6 0 0 0 0 3 1.7
Sold land 0 0 0 0 1 0.3 1 0.6 0 0 1 0.6
Community solidarity 0 0 2 0.7 5 1.4 0 0 0 0 1 0.6
Was exempted from payment 0 0 2 0.7 0 0 1 0.6 3 1.0 1 0.6
Payment was subsidised 0 0 5 1.8 3 0.9 0 0 2 0.6 2 1.1
Others 0 0 4 1.5 1 0.3 2 1.2 3 1.0 4 2.2
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installment (p = 0.06) more than other SES groups. Both
the inter-quartile ratios and the concentration indices
support the trend of inequity in use of OOPS to pay for
healthcare. The results also show that as SES increases,
households use more of own money to pay for health-
care. Also, as SES quartile decreased, the households
sold their assets to pay for healthcare in Ezilo. The bet-
ter-off quartiles were more able to borrow to pay for
healthcare in Ezilo and Nkalagu, while the converse was
true in Eke-na-ene.
Logistic regression analysis showed that there were
some statistically significant determinants of choice of
OOPS for the payment of healthcare (Table 7). All the
regression analyses were statistically significant. The
expenditure on treatment was positively and statistically
significantly correlated with use of OOPS in four of the
communities, although the magnitudes of the coeffi-
cients were small. Females were less likely than men to
use OOPS, although the finding was only statistically
significant in Udi. Factors that had positive influence on
use of OOPS were respondents being household heads
in Udi, higher number of household residents in Eke-
na-ene and Ezilo, years of schooling in Ezilo and trans-
portation costs in Abakiliki and Eke-na-ene. However,
transportation costs had a negative influence on use of
OOPS in Ezilo. The weights of the SES indices were
insignificant explanatory factors, with the exception of
Ezilo, where it was negatively related to use of OOPS.
Discussion
The results indicate that most respondents of the study
communities used OOPS as the commonest type of pay-
ment mechanism for health care consumption. However,
this could be due to absence of wide-scale payment
alternatives to OOPS. It is possible that if NHIS and
other pre-payment (especially health insurance) mechan-
isms were widely available, payment by OOPS would
not be so high. The limited use of payment mechanisms
such as reimbursement, installment and in-kind pay-
ments either reflect their low acceptability by providers
or a low level of awareness that they could be used by
the consumers.
In the study area, OOPS appeared largely unin-
fluenced by socio-economic status (SES). Hence, the dif-
ferences in relative use of different providers had no
relationship with use of OOPS. However, OOPS was
found to be more significantly used by the urban com-
munities while the rural communities used more of
reimbursement, installment payment and in-kind pay-
ment mechanisms. This may be because the urban
dwellers are more educated and have more assets and
economic power. The lack of SES differentials in use of
OOPS by respondents implies poor people are suffering
Table 6 SES differences in use of OOPS for respondents
and other household members
Respondents n (%) Other household
members n (%)
Abakiliki N (%) N (%)
Q1 (most poor) 47 (22) 52 (20)
Q2 (very poor) 60 (29) 61 (22)
Q3 (poor) 45 (21) 76 (29)
Q4 (least poor) 58 (28) 76 (29)
Chi-square 7.16* 24.21***
Poor-rich ratio 0.81 0.68
Concentration index 0.03 0.10
Ezilo
Q1 (most poor) 46 (22) 42 (20)
Q2 (very poor) 48 (23) 48 (24)
Q3 (poor) 59 (29) 57 (28)
Q4 (least poor) 52 (26) 57 (28)
Chi-square 4.25 7.32*
Poor-rich ratio 0.88 0.74
Concentration index 0.04 0.06
Nkalagu
Q1 (most poor) 65(24) 63 (20)
Q2 (very poor) 61 (22) 76 (25)
Q3 (poor) 73 (27) 83 (27)
Q4 (least poor) 74 (27) 86 (28)
Chi-square 6.35* 22.55***
Poor-rich ratio 0.88 0.73
Concentration index 0.04 0.06
Eke-na-ene
Q1 (most poor) 43 (23) 33 (21)
Q2 (very poor) 45 (25) 33 (21)
Q3 (poor) 51 (27) 47 (30)
Q4 (least poor) 45 (25) 44 (28)
Chi-square 2.35 9.38
Poor-rich ratio 0.50 0.03**
Concentration index 0.01 0.03
Enugu
Q1 (most poor) 74 (24) 64 (22)
Q2 (very poor) 80 (26) 74 (25)
Q3 (poor) 78 (25) 76 (25)
Q4 (least poor) 78 (25) 83 (28)
Chi-square 2.66 16.14***
Poor-rich ratio 0.9 0.77
Concentration index 0.01 0.05
Udi
Q1 (most poor) 32 (28) 24 (20)
Q2 (very poor) 26 (23) 22 (19)
Q3 (poor) 30 (27) 34 (29)
Q4 (least poor) 25 (22) 38 (32)
Chi-square 0.90 10.00**
Poor-rich ratio 1.28 0.63
Concentration index -0.02 0.13
Note: * = p < 0.10; ** = p < 0.05; and ***p < 0.01
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and are not protected from the hazards and uncertainty
of paying for healthcare when ill. This can lead to indi-
viduals to either delay or not seek healthcare at all.
Some of the inequity might be explained by urban-rural
differences especially taking into consideration that the
most-poor people usually reside in the rural areas and
options for healthcare payments are also more limited
in rural areas.
User fees paid through OOPS, which has been univer-
sally recognised to be very retrogressive, was the most
common payment mechanism used to pay for care by
all the SES quartiles in different geographic settings.
The impact of OOPS is worse on the poorest house-
holds as they are more likely to have higher occurrences
of catastrophe due to health payments through OOPS.
Payment mechanisms that engender equity should be
developed and made part and parcel of the healthcare
system. Countries with more developed economies have
managed to move away from user fees for health care
towards social insurance or tax-based models [26].
Although the NHIS has enrolled the federal government
civil servants, the NHIS was rarely used by the study
communities indicating that the mechanism is still rare
in the country. The irony is that the countries whose
populations can least afford to pay for health care are
the ones who still rely on user fees even though it is a
sub-optimal method of financing. However, experiences
in other countries show that user fees can be abolished
successfully [11,26,17]. After all, the income that they
are bringing in is not is usually not substantial. None-
theless, the principal questions with regards to elimina-
tion of user fees are still: how to appropriately fill the
financing gap resulting from such elimination, how to
provide evidence that abolition is responsible for better
access to modern healthcare; and to determine if there
are other important reasons that might have negative
impact on the demand for modern healthcare (e.g. low
quality, bribes).
A sizeable proportion of the respondents in the three
rural communities in the present study borrowed money
in order to pay for health care. Borrowing to pay medi-
cal fees has been reported in a number of studies [27].
The adoption of specific short-term responses to crisis
events such as sale of land or movable household assets
and taking a loan were not commonly used to cope
with payment for healthcare in the present study. It
seems that households therefore make decisions which
reflect trade-offs between competing objectives.
Research on households’ responses to drought and fam-
ine suggests that households often adopt coping strate-
gies which aim to protect the viability of future
livelihoods, demonstrating an “awareness of a future
beyond the current crisis when assets may be needed
for other purposes” [28]. Lands are often considered as
‘core’ assets, which are essential to maintaining current
and future incomes, as opposed to ‘surplus’ assets which
are primarily a store of value. Disposal of ‘surplus’ assets
does not lead households to incur catastrophic opportu-
nity costs through a decline in subsequent incomes, and
is more easily reversible. However, disposal of ‘core’ pro-
ductive assets may lead to a ‘poverty ratchet’ [29,30] in
which a household is unable to protect itself from sub-
sequent financial shocks.
It was not surprising that taking a loan was not a pop-
ular coping mechanism adopted by the respondents.
The reason may be that formal credit institutions
employ screening devices to overcome information and
incentive problems [31], and this often results in the













Status in household -.11 (.58) -.37 (.58) -.37 (.49) -.80 (.63) -.67 (.52) .95 (.38)**
No of household
residents
-.09 (.07) .07 (.04)* -.02 (.03) .11 (.05)** -.01 (.08) .07 (.06)
Sex -.35 (.58) .18 (.51) -.05 (.49) .80 (.61) -.22 (.53) -.91 (.32)***
Age .03 (.01)** .003 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.0002 (.01) .01 (.02) -.02 (.01)
Years of schooling .001 (.04) .04 (.03)* .02 (.04) -.01 (.03) .01 (.04) -.04 (.04)
Marital status -1.06 (.66) -1.2 (.69)* .59 (.70) 1.00 (.87) .43 (.62) 1.30 (1.16)
Cost of treatment .01 (.001)*** .001 (.0002)*** .0004 (.0002)** .0002 (.0002) .0002 (.0001) .0004 (.0002)*
Transport costs .02 (.006)*** .002 (.001) -.002 (.001)* .02 (.004)*** -.002 (.001) -.001 (.002)
SES index .04 (.10) -.18 (.10)* .09 (.10) .05 (.10) .09 (.15) .04 (.10)
Constant -.56 (.88) .24 (.99) .94 (.83) -1.43 (1.01) 1.26 (.96) -1.38 (1.31)
LR chi2 197.6*** 64.4*** 20.0** 40.7*** 11.46*** 22.31***
Pseudo R2 0.39 0.13 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.06
No of correct predictions 86.52% 67.21% 73.40% 69.80% 88.64% 65.86%
Significance of parameters * <0.10, **<0.05, ***<0.01
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exclusion of poor households from access to formal
credit. Most poor households may not qualify for loans
as loans are usually made available to those with the
ability to repay as assessed by a credit officer. Many
households with the capacity to obtain loans may be
unwilling to seek formal loans to pay medical bills due
to high interest rate and the fear that they may find it
difficult to repay the loans in the future. Similarly, com-
munity solidarity was not a popular coping mechanism
even though it has been reported that it can overcome
information asymmetries and incentive problems and as
such can be used as informal credit market to house-
holds who are excluded from formal credit institutions
[32,33]. There was very little evidence of actual exis-
tence of fee exemptions and other discretionary pay-
ment strategies that could be used to pay for the
poorest and hence improve their level of access and uti-
lization to healthcare services.
Removing user fees and limiting the use of OOPS for
essential healthcare conditions and for control of ende-
mic diseases should be regarded as part of a package to
improve quality and sustainability of health services.
These should be complemented by implementing appro-
priate health insurance schemes to cover the informal
sector and ensure financial risk protection of the poor
in the context the National Health Insurance Scheme.
The abolition of user fees is also cited by the Millen-
nium Project report as a necessary prerequisite for
achieving the health-related Millennium Development
Goals (MDGS) [34]. However, as some authors cau-
tioned from the experiences in Uganda, the removal of
user fees should be accompanied by drug availability
and improved quality of services [11]. It is however
noteworthy that not all health systems will be able to
remove user fees immediately, nor will removal of fees
be successful without complementary supply-side
reforms.
In the right place and manner, abolition of user fees
through OOPS can be part of a powerful vicious circle
as it can improve access and outcomes. Studies in Bur-
kina Faso [35] and elsewhere [36-38] have shown that
the introduction of fees resulted in deterring people,
especially the poor and children, from using health care
services. In contrast to this, a widely cited study from
Cameroon found that the poor used more state-pro-
vided health care despite fee increases as a result of
quality improvements [39]. Similarly, growing demand
after introduction of cost recovery and better quality of
care was found in a pilot study in Niger [40].
Conclusion
This study has demonstrated the existence of SES
inequities in use of OOPS to pay for healthcare services.
Developing equitable financing approaches will depend
on the assessment of the burden and determinants of
OOPS on healthcare seeking by different socio-eco-
nomic and geographic groups, leading to determining
how best to protect the poor. Innovative approaches
that would reduce the inequity in financial access to and
utilization of healthcare services by the poor are needed,
especially if the health-related millennium development
goals (MDGs) are to be met in Nigeria. However, the
attainment of the MDGs in health could be hampered
by OOPS.
Equity can be achieved if public expenditures are tar-
geted to poorer and underserved sections of the society,
and if an appropriate financial risk protection mechan-
ism(s) are adopted across the states and the country in
general, especially within the context of the National
Health Insurance Scheme. In order to avoid the negative
incentives of OOPS on those who are unable (or unwill-
ing) to pay, user fee exemptions can provide a way of
avoiding the negative equity impacts of such a policy
[2]. Hence, discretional fees and quality improvements
of services at reduced costs are additional strategies for
enhancing financial equity in access and utilization of
healthcare services.
The body of knowledge on how OOPS affect equita-
ble access to care and utilization of services in Nigeria
and in many sub-Saharan African countries needs to
be continually increased so as to help improve evi-
dence-based decision making and accelerate efforts of
policy makers to move away from OOPS to more
insurance-based payment mechanisms. In addition, this
will help ensure that people do not have to pay out-of-
pocket at point of consumption of healthcare services.
Future studies should examine other dimensions of
incidence (such as geographic differences) and conse-
quences of OOPS such as catastrophe and impoverish-
ment in different settings amongst different population
groups. Future studies that would examine the deter-
minants of OOPS should also broaden the inquiry to
include alternatives such as people refraining from
seeking healthcare.
Additional file 1: Household Questionnaire.
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